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We estimate the private value of Apple’s iPhone by observing abnormal stock market 
reactions to news announcements and patent publications related to the innovation. Our 
estimate of the lower bound on the market valuation of iPhone is fairly high, at minimum 
30 billion U.S. (event day) dollars. We find that patentable technology explains about 
25% of that total value. We also find a weak negative reaction among Apple’s rivals to 
the news about iPhone but no significant reaction to the publication of patent documents 
concerning iPhone can be observed. The evidence suggests that the value of iPhone 
primarily stems from Apple’s management and marketing abilities and efforts rather than 
from underlying “hard” technologies and intellectual property.  
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1. Introduction 
 Valuation of innovations and the determinants of that valuation are crucial but 
challenging questions for corporate managers and technology policy makers. One 
popular valuation method uses the stock market returns as their measuring tool. This 
valuation effort is often hampered by noise that is present in stock returns. In this study, 
we tackle the challenges in measurement of the value of innovations by conducting a 
careful in-depth case study of a single technology product.  
 The high-profile entry by Apple into the cellular phone market via the launch of 
iPhone in 2007 presents a fruitful case to study valuation of new product innovations. 
The cellular phone industry is very patent intensive, and characterized by cumulative 
innovation, strong network effects and a high degree of standardization. Such features 
tend to create high implicit barriers to entry, thus leading to a high level of market 
concentration. Apple’s positions in the product and stock markets provide a number of 
features that support the use of stock market reactions to news announcements in 
valuation of iPhone. First, the size and the status of Apple allow us to study the value of a 
market entry from a viewpoint that differs markedly from that of a typical technology 
entrant with a small size and a low trading volume. Specifically, Apple’s stock has high 
trading volume, which should reduce concerns of thin trading that tends to plague 
innovation valuation studies. Second, stock market reactions are likely to be more 
informative with innovations that are highly visible, as identification of an innovation is 
easier than in the case of incremental innovations (Sorescu and Spanjol 2008). 
Undoubtedly, iPhone falls into this category. Furthermore, the high level of concentration 
in the cellular phone market should amplify the effect of product innovation, as 
suggested by findings by Doukas and Switzer (1992). Finally, the high level of 
concentration in the cellular market allows us to also study the effects of the introduction 
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of iPhone on Apple’s main horizontal rivals in the industry, which are relatively easy to 
identify in the market dominated by a limited number of large companies.  
 Innovative activity can be tracked through (1) news announcements and rumors, 
and (2) publications of patent documents, but the two methods are seldom studied 
together.1 In this paper, we measure Apple’s stock reactions to publications of both news 
and patent documents related to iPhone. Using the two sources should not only give a 
more accurate estimate of the value of iPhone but also shed light on the determinants of 
that value: The value of an innovation can be viewed as stemming from both investments 
in developing “hard” technologies embodied in the firm’s intellectual property, and from 
the firm’s managerial ability to take advantage of its own and its rivals’ R&D efforts 
(“soft technologies”) (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010). The soft technologies would thus 
capture the firm’s knowhow in operations, management, marketing, assimilating external 
information, etc. We view value reactions to patent applications as more pure measures 
of the value of hard technology, whereas the reactions to news would capture overall 
value effects.2  
 The launch of Apple’s iPhone provides a particularly interesting background for 
our objective of distinguishing the value of hard technologies and intellectual property 
from other components of innovation value. The high-patent intensity of the cellular 
phone industry makes extensive patenting a pre-requisite for entering the industry. 
Hence, Apple has faced a need to patent their iPhone-related innovations actively.3 Given 
the high visibility and the user appeal of iPhone, one could expect that a significant 
                                                 
1 A prominent exception is Lerner (2006) who uses both news and patent document announcements to 
identify financial innovations and their determinants. 
2 Naturally, the two sources of value are not completely mutually exclusive. One can posit that firms with 
high managerial abilities would have more value in their patents as well. Similarly, news announcements of 
the new upcoming products might at least partially reflect value of the technology too. 
3 In the launch event of iPhone, January 9, 2007, Steve Jobs, the CEO of Apple, emphasizes several times 
that the technology is patented, e.g., “We have filed for over 200 patents for all the inventions in iPhone 
and we intend to protect them”.  
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fraction of iPhone’s value comes from new hard technologies. However, the intellectual 
property environment in the cellular phone industry is also characterized by less precise 
property rights than, say in the pharmaceutical industry (see, e.g., Bessen and Maurer 
2008). This easily results in “a patent thicket” and hence almost unavoidable patent 
infringement, which should reduce the value of patents.4 New cellular phone products 
also constitute prime examples of cumulative innovation where new innovations are built 
on previous ones. In such an environment the value of new product may reflect the value 
of intellectual property over previous innovations rather than the intellectual property of 
the new product (Green and Scotchmer 1995). Moreover, Apple is known for its brand 
management and marketing, and the introduction of iPhone created a possibility for 
leveraging economies of scale between it and Apple’s existing products (e.g., Mac and 
iPod) which competent corporate management would be able to realize. The case of 
iPhone also offers an opportunity to explore the effect of product pre-announcement to 
Apple and its competitors. Product pre-announcements constitute an important strategic 
communication tool for a firm, especially in network industries where consumers’ 
decisions to wait for an upcoming product introduction play a major strategic role 
(Dranove and Gandal 2003 and Sorescu, Shankar and Kushwaha 2007). Finally, 
competent corporate management should know not only how to exploit the firm’s own 
innovative efforts but also how to absorb and assimilate the efforts by others (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990 and Zahra and George 2002). Hence it is conceivable that much of 
iPhone’s value comes from marketing and management rather than from novel 
technologies.5 
                                                 
4 Shapiro (2001) defines a patent thicket as “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a 
company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology”. According to 
Economists (21 October, 2010), Apple’s iPhone is indeed at the centre of one the greatest patent 
controversies in the history. 
5 We define management ability broadly, including absorptive capacity and ability to realize potential 
organizational synergies from various product lines.   
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Our methodology builds on a long line of literature of using the event study 
methodology in valuation of innovations (see, e.g., Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991 
for an early example, and Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich 2007, and Sood and Tellis 2009 
for recent ones). As mentioned above, valuation based on stock market reactions is 
known to be sensitive to a number of issues. Those issues include identification of an 
innovation and dates relevant to it, estimation period, trading volume and market 
structure (see, e.g., Doukas and Switzer 1992, MacKinlay 1997, Tkac 1999). Following 
Girotra, et al. (2007) who study the value of R&D portfolios in the pharmaceutical 
industry, we use the methodology suggested by Tkac (1999) to distinguish significant 
events among a large number of news announcements, using the daily trading value as an 
indicator of significance. Similar to Chen, et al. (2005), we also extend our analysis to 
Apple’s rivals in the cellular phone industry. One of our contributions is to combine the 
value of news and patent application announcements. Building on Austin’s (1993) 
seminal paper, we use the event-study approach in patent valuation, estimating both the 
value of patent (applications) to the firm applying for those patents, and their effects on 
rival firms using daily stock returns. Besides estimating returns on granted patents, which 
has been the focus in the previous literature, we use the publication of a patent 
application as an event date, as most of the new information embodied in patent 
documents becomes public at that point.6 This method allows us to study the market 
value of individual patents, and it should be seen as complementary to the popular 
method of estimating the market value of patents on a more aggregate level (see, e.g., 
Bloom and van Reenen 2002, Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenber 2004). Here, our paper comes 
close to the literature that studies the stock market reactions to patent litigation decisions 
and settlements, stemming from Cutler and Summers (1988). 
                                                 
6 Pending patent applications filed prior to November 29, 2000 were not published in the U.S and thus the 
distinction between applications and grants is not an issue, e.g., in Austin (1993).  
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Studying a unique case allows us to mitigate many concerns associated with 
valuation based on stock market reactions. Moreover, previous valuation studies fail to 
consider the hard and soft technology components of value separately. We argue that 
stock market reactions to news announcements might better reflect firm’s marketing and 
management abilities and efforts related to the innovation, whereas the reactions to patent 
application publications could reflect the value of underlying “hard” technologies and 
intellectual property. We thus contribute to the innovation valuation literature by 
studying stock market reactions to both types of information events. In this respect our 
paper has a link to an extensive literature on the determinants of firm productivity which 
has documented substantial and persistent productivity differences across firms, even 
after controlling for measurable inputs such as capital intensity, R&D expenditures and 
patent portfolios. Reminiscent of our findings, Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) argue that 
variation in management practices largely accounts for the persistent productivity 
differences.  
 We find the value of iPhone to be fairly high, at minimum 30 billion U.S. 
dollars.7 The patentable technologies explain about 25% of the total value. More 
specifically, our estimates of the value of iPhone based on the news announcements vary 
from $19.7 billion to $24.2 billion, depending on the estimation method. Accounting for 
abnormal reactions to patent application publications contributes another $6.9 billion 
(publication date) dollars to the value of the product. Given the Apple market 
capitalization of $190.6 billion at the end of 2009, the news announcement-based value 
of iPhone would be between 10% and 13% of the total market capitalization, with the 
patent application publications contributing another 4% of the market capitalization. We 
                                                 
7 At the end of section 4 we discuss the reasons for why we think that $30 billion establishes a lower bound 
on the estimate of the value of iPhone to Apple. For example, we use a tight filter in selecting the news 
events to consider, which is likely to leave some value effects unobserved. Also, all our valuation figures 
are measured in event day dollars. Compounding of those values to the present day would increase the 
value. 
 7
also find that the shares of some of Apple’s rivals in the cellular phone industry react 
negatively to the news about iPhone but similar effects are not present in connection to 
the publications of patent documents concerning iPhone. This further suggests that 
marketing and management abilities and efforts play a key role in explaining the value of 
iPhone.  
 In the next section we describe our data and the industry environment. In section 
3 we explain our valuation method. The results of the valuation are presented in section 4 
and section 5 presents the conclusions.  
 
2. Data 
 We study the valuation effects of news related to iPhone from the first hints of the 
product until December 31, 2009. We employ various data sources in this study. Our 
main source for news announcements is Lexis-Nexis, with Bloomberg and Google being 
used as secondary sources. There, we search for news announcements that are related to 
iPhone. In total, we find 74 days on which news announcements related to iPhone occur. 
The earliest of these announcement dates back to December 15, 1999, when Apple 
registered iPhone.org website. The first significant group of news came in 2004, as 
Apple’s partnership with Motorola on a product called ROKR became public. The 
official announcement of iPhone was made by Steve Jobs on January 9, 2007. Out of the 
74 announcement dates, 31 take place prior to that date. Table 1 indicates the breakdown 
of our events. A full list of all news items analyzed is provided in Appendix 1. 
Another potential source for information on the upcoming product is patent 
documents and trademark filings. Indeed, a key rationale for patent system is to enhance 
information disclosure (see, e.g., Kultti, Toikka, and Takalo 2006), and disclosure 
requirements related to patent documents are inherently rooted in patent laws (see, e.g., 
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35 United States Constitution (U.S.C.) §112 and §122). Furthermore, patents can only be 
granted to new and non-obvious inventions (e.g., 35 U.S.C. §102 and §103), and thus the 
information disclosed in a patent application should be new to the market almost by 
definition.8 In the United States, like in other countries, the average lag from the filing of 
a patent application to a patent grant is several years but pending applications are often 
made public 18 months after the earliest filing date.9 We hence seek both the dates when 
patent applications are published and the dates when patents are issued. 
We use the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) patent database 
to identify those patent filings made by Apple that are related to a cellular phone product. 
Generally, it is not easy to identify patents associated with a certain type of innovation 
without Type I or II errors (see, e.g., Bessen and Hunt 2007 and Hall, Thoma and Torrisi 
2009 for discussion on how to identify software and financial patents, respectively). In 
our case, the challenge is to distinguish Apple’s patent applications concerning iPhone 
from Apple’s applications that are related to their other product lines. Following, e.g., 
Bessen and Hunt 2007, we use a search algorithm based on keywords rather than, e.g., 
the USPTO patent classification system to identify the patent documents related to 
iPhone.10 Whenever it is unclear from the patent application description whether the 
patent is related to cellular phones, we download the full patent application that includes 
information such as pictures of the invention to be patented, to study the application area 
further. 
                                                 
888 In theory, the situation is somewhat more complicated, especially in the United States, which uses the 
first-to-invent rule in determining the novelty criterion. Hence only an information leakage prior to (12 
months of) filing the patent application constitutes a novelty bar. However, as firms usually strive to keep 
their R&D information secret, especially when they aim at filing patents, information disclosed in patent 
applications should generally be new to the market.  
9 More specifically, the 18 months publication rule applies to all U.S. patent applications filed on or after 
29 November, 2000, subject to some exceptions such design patents the cases in which an applicant waives 
her right to seek patent protection outside the United States.. 
10 We first studied several applications clearly related to iPhone in detail to identify appropriate keywords. 
This suggested the following keyword search algorithm: (((((portable OR (mobile AND device)) OR 
cellular) OR telecom) OR (wireless AND device)) OR ringtone). 
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We find patent documents for a total of 213 iPhone related inventions.11 The 
sample includes 47 applications published prior to the product pre-announcement on 
January 9, 2007. The earliest publication date is February 7, 2002. There are 44 (utility 
and design) patents without prior publication, and they therefore are included in our 
analysis of granted patents but not in the analysis of patent applications. Since many of 
the patent applications share common publication dates, we end up with a total of 97 
unique patent application publication dates. Following similar procedure, we identify 72 
unique patent issue dates.  
We also identify dates related to trademark filings on iPhone in various countries. 
The trademark filings occur relatively early, with the first filing in Singapore taking place 
on October 18, 2002, and filings in the UK and Australia following within the same year. 
In total, we find six trademark filings, all of them occurring prior to the product pre-
announcement on January 9, 2007. The trademark filing in Canada on October 14, 2004 
coincides with an extremely favorable quarterly earnings announcement, and is therefore 
dropped from further analysis due to event contamination.    
For stock return and trading volume data, we use the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) database. As part of our analysis deals with Apple’s competitors, 
we retain stock returns also for Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia and Research in Motion (RIM) 
from CRSP. Some of the largest companies in the cellular phone industry are not traded 
in the U.S. exchanges. Therefore, we use Datastream as an alternative data source for 
stock returns on Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics, and HTC Corp. 
 
                                                 
11 The unity of invention requirement maintains that one patent application can only refer to one invention 
(see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §121). Our figure is a sum of all iPhone related granted (utility and design) patents and 
published (utility) patent applications that were still pending as of 31 December, 2009. In other words, 
those patents from which we have both an issued patent and a published patent application are counted just 
once. Albeit being in line with Apple’s own estimate (cf. footnote 2), our figure is likely to slightly 
underestimate the number of iPhone related patent applications.  
 10
3. Event Study 
 In order to establish the dollar value of iPhone to Apple, we complete a number 
of event studies that explore the abnormal stock return that various information releases 
cause on Apple’s stock. As mentioned above, we identify 74 different days on which 
news releases or speculation regarding iPhone occur. We use the event study 
methodology (see MacKinlay, 1997 for a survey) to study the valuation effect of these 
announcements. Our primary event study method is based on the market model, as shown 
in equation (1): 
 
    itmtiiit RR εβα ++= ,    (1) 
 
where Rit and Rmt are the period-t stock returns for firm i and the market, respectively, 
and αi and βi are parameters estimated within the estimation period. Finally, εit is the zero 
mean disturbance term. As the market model generates expected returns for the stock, we 
then measure abnormal returns within the event window following equation (2): 
 
    mtiiitit RRAR βα −−= .   (2) 
 
 Since the market model parameter estimates are sensitive to our choice of 
estimation period, we vary the estimation period to test the robustness of our findings. 
Our first choice of estimation period is to use a period outside the main time period of 
iPhone events for Apple, as significant events may cause bias in market model parameter 
estimation. One could also posit that an earlier estimation period allows us to estimate the 
relation between Apple’s stock and the market portfolio without iPhone. We therefore 
use the daily returns from 2003 and 2004 to estimate the alpha and the beta in equation 
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(1). The CRSP value-weighted market index serves as a proxy for Rm in all our tests 
requiring a market portfolio.  
The beta for Apple with the two year estimation period is 1.3104, and the alpha is 
0.0022. However, the parameters for Apple have somewhat varied during our sample 
period, as witnessed by Figure 1, where we use a rolling 250-day window to calculate the 
market model beta for Apple. To ensure that our choice of estimation window does not 
significantly affect our findings, we use the more standard estimation window of (-250,-
10) as an alternative setting. 
A constant-mean-return model is an alternative way to observe the effect of an 
event on asset returns (MacKinlay 1997). In the constant-mean-return model, the 
expected returns are assumed to equal the observed mean return during the estimation 
period. We use this method both with the fixed estimation period of years 2003-2004, 
and with (-250,-10) estimation period as additional alternative metrics on the value of 
each event. 
In order to minimize potential biases caused by contaminating events, we use the 
tightest possible event window by observing abnormal returns only on the day of the 
news announcement (t = 0). In this effort, we make three assumptions. First, we assume 
that the news items bring genuinely new information to the market, so that we do not 
need to account for possible information leakage prior to the event. Second, we assume 
that the market on Apple’s stock is deep and efficient enough that new information will 
be embedded in the stock price within a single trading day12. Third, we assume that there 
is no systematic pattern of contaminating events occurring on the event dates that we 
consider.13 An exception to the rule of using the publication date as the event day is made 
for those news announcements that became public after 4:00 p.m. Eastern time. 
                                                 
12 We later provide data on the days surrounding the event, to reduce concerns regarding both of these 
assumptions.  
13 We also study each event date carefully in order to exclude days with obvious contaminating events. 
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NASDAQ reports closing prices for the day to the CRSP database based on the Market 
Hours, which end at 4:00 p.m. Therefore, any market reaction to announcements that 
occur after that time should be reflected in the following day’s CRSP stock return. For 
that reason, we use t = +1 as the event day for those events. Out of the total of 74 news 
events, five fall into this category.  
On the first row of Table 2, we report the abnormal mean return for Apple on all 
74 news events. The average one-day abnormal return for Apple is 0.47%, which is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. We compare the Apple returns to those of their 
main competitors. Out of them, CRSP returns are available for Nokia, Motorola, 
Ericsson, and RIM. On the event days, Nokia also posts a moderate average abnormal 
gain of 0.29%, whereas Motorola (-0.07%), RIM (-0.19%), and Ericsson (-0.37%) lose 
value on average on the event days related to iPhone. None of the competitors’ reactions 
is statistically significant at the conventional levels. 
In an effort to focus on the set of events that bring significant new information to 
the market, Tkac (1999) suggests using trading volume as an indicator. Her model 
indicates that extraordinary events induce an increase in the volume of the firm’s stock 
trading (measured as daily market volume/market capitalization), relative to the trading 
volume for the entire market (measured as daily market volume for the market/total 
market capitalization). Thus, she motivates the use of a model similar to the market 
model for returns, presented in our equation (1), to identify significant events for a firm. 
Girotra, et al. (2007) use the same method in their study of R&D value in the 
pharmaceutical industry. We follow the work of Tkac (1999), and identify event days 
with abnormal trading volume for Apple, by estimating the following equation:   
 
    ittimtiiit DVV ελδγ +++= ,    (3) 
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where Vit is the natural log of the ratio of trading volume over market capitalization for 
Apple on day t, Vmt is a similar measure for the market on day t, and Dt is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one for the event day.14 We run a separate regression for 
each event. As trading volume of Apple has undergone significant and persistent shifts 
during our study period (see Figure 2), we use an estimation period that is near the event, 
and thus include the days (-250,+1) in each regression.15 An event is determined to have 
significant abnormal volume if λi is statistically significant at the 5% level or higher. In 
order to account for heteroskedasticy present in daily trading volume data, we use robust 
standard errors. 
Our tests indicate that 22 of our 74 total news events are associated with 
abnormal trading volume. We next take these events under a closer examination. The 
second row of Table 2 indicates the average abnormal returns separately for these events. 
The effect measured in Apple’s stock reaction is markedly more significant, with the 
mean abnormal return of 1.93% on day t = 0, which is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Except for Nokia’s slightly positive average reaction at 0.20%, all other 
competitors exhibit negative abnormal mean returns in this sample of events, varying 
from -0.20% for Motorola to -0.39% for RIM. However, none of the competitor average 
returns on day t=0 differs from zero at the conventional levels of statistical significance. 
As a robustness check, we use internet activity related to iPhone to gauge the 
informative value of our events. We first extract data from Google trends with a search 
word “iPhone”. Then, following Da, et al. (2010) who use Google trends to measure 
                                                 
14 Relative daily market volume for both Apple and the total market exhibit skewness, which is why we use 
the natural log of the relative trading volume in this specification.  
15 In Figure 2, we report abnormal trading volume in number of shares, rather than in natural logs, while in 
our tests, we use the logs. 
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investor attention to stocks, we construct an index to capture abnormal internet activity as 
follows: 
 
ASVIt = log(SVIt) – log[Mean(SVIt-1, ..., SVIt-60)]..    (4) 
 
In (4), ASVIt is the Abnormal Search Volume Index for day t. In contrast to Da, et al. 
(2010), who utilize weekly data, we use daily data. Also, they specify normal internet 
activity as the median SVI for weeks -1 to -8, whereas we use the mean for days -1 to -
60. Our use of mean instead of median is dictated by the value of zero for numerous days 
particularly in the early part of our study period, resulting in the median value of zero for 
several events. When we compare the events that are indicated by the trading volume 
measure in equation (3) as bringing new information to the market, the ASVI measure for 
that group is higher than that for the group that does not exhibit abnormal relative trading 
volume. The difference is statistically significant at the 10% level.  
In Figure 3, we observe average abnormal returns for days surrounding each 
event. Compared to the relatively large abnormal return on day t = 0 for Apple, all other 
days within the (-2,+2) window exhibit only modest average effects. This finding 
increases our confidence on our event day identification strategy. We further repeat the 
same analysis to include Apple’s competitors in Figure 4. Besides Nokia, Samsung and 
HTC, all of the competitors exhibit slightly negative abnormal returns on day t = 0.16     
Next, we compare our findings across different estimation periods and methods. 
The results are reported in Table 3. The table indicates that variation across models and 
estimation periods is negligible. The average abnormal return related to the event days 
varies from the minimum of 1.81% using the constant-mean-return model with an 
                                                 
16 In this graph, we utilize Datastream returns for firms, denoted by an asterisk (*), that are not traded in the 
United States. Since all three of them trade on exchanges that close prior to the U.S. trading hours, we use 
the one-day lag returns for them in all of our analysis. 
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estimation period that immediately precedes the event, to the maximum of 1.93%, which 
result is obtained from the market model with a fixed estimation period. Adding the 
Fama-French factors to our market model reduces the average event day abnormal return 
by one basis point. 
We complete a similar analysis for days on which patent applications related to 
iPhone have been made public. As mentioned above, we identify a total of 97 such days. 
In Table 4, we report average abnormal returns for both Apple, and those of its 
competitors that are traded in the U.S. stock market. The results are based on the market 
model, with years 2003 and 2004 serving as the estimation period. Panel A of Table 4 
shows the average abnormal returns across all 97 days. The abnormal return is slightly 
positive for Apple, but falls far short of statistical significance. Similarly, the competitors 
do not appear to exhibit any signs of systematic abnormal performance around patent 
application publication dates for Apple. In Panel B of Table 4, we focus on the patent 
application publications that are connected with abnormal trading volume. 31 of the 97 
dates fall into that category. Furthermore, we check the dates of abnormal volume for 
potential event contamination due to corporate information releases on those days. This 
check is performed using both Lexis-Nexis, and Bloomberg. Coincidentally, it appears 
quite common for patent application publications to coincide with corporate information 
releases. On nine of the 31 days, we detect either quarterly earnings announcements, 
high-level managerial changes, or on one occasion an adoption of a stock option 
expensing rule in accounting. Thus, we are left with 22 days on which patent applications 
are published, and which are free of contamination. On those days, the Apple average 
abnormal return is 1.13%. The effect is statistically significant, with the p-value of 5.5%. 
Next, we repeat the abnormal return analysis for the 72 days when patents are 
granted. This includes patents both with and without prior publications of corresponding 
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patent applications. Since patents without prior publications are generally less valuable17, 
and since information about the (more valuable) patents with prior publications becomes 
public when the corresponding applications are published, it is unlikely that the grant of 
the patent would bring significant new information to the market. This prediction is 
confirmed by our data, as the average reaction to the patent grants is very small relative 
to the findings reported above. For all 71 patent grants, the daily average abnormal stock 
reaction is -0.11%. Out of those 71 days, 13 exhibit abnormal trading volume, and on 
those days, the abnormal return is 0.35%. We have not performed a contamination check 
on those days, which means that the abnormal trading volume could well be caused by 
other corporate events for Apple, taking place on those days. Based on the evidence that 
patent grants do not appear to bring new information to the market, we exclude them 
from further analysis.  
Finally, we analyze the set of six days on which Apple filed a trademark for 
iPhone. The first two (in Singapore and UK) occur on subsequent trading days, on 
October 18 and October 21, 2002. The filing in Singapore exhibits abnormal trading 
volume, while the filing to the UK fails to do so. Filing in Australia on December 3, 2002 
also fails to generate abnormal trading volume. The filing in Canada on October 14, 2004 
is met with a very large abnormal trading volume. However, that filing coincides with a 
very favorable quarterly earnings announcement. Apple stock return on that day 
exceeded 14%, making it the best day for the stock in the entire decade. We exclude the 
Canadian trademark filing from our analysis for obvious reasons. Finally, trademark 
filings to New Zealand and the US in September 2006 fail to generate abnormal trading 
volume, which leaves us with only a single trademark filing event with abnormal trading 
                                                 
17 These patents fall into two categories: 1) The publication requirement for patent applications applies 
only to inventions that are to be patented internationally. Apple may have decided to waive the possibility 
of international patenting, perhaps because the invention was not patentable outside the United States or 
perhaps because the invention was not significant enough to warrant a costly international application 
process. 2) They deal with design patents which arguably have weaker protection than utility patents. 
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volume to analyze. On the day of trademark filing in Singapore on October 18, 2002, the 
abnormal return for Apple stock was 0.78%, using the same fixed estimation period as 
above, and the reaction is statistically insignificant. We therefore exclude trademark 
filing events also from further analysis.    
 
4. Market Value of Changes 
 In order to estimate the value of the iPhone product to Apple, we follow Chaney, 
et al. (1991) and others by observing the market capitalization of Apple, Inc. on the day 
prior to each event, and multiplying that figure by the abnormal return related to each 
event day. For a total value of the product, we then sum up these values across all events. 
We perform this calculation using each of our abnormal return metrics, focusing only on 
the events that are determined to be significant based on the trading volume data. We 
thus rely on Tkac’s (1999) model that indicates that a change in the relative trading 
volume of the stock implies a significant arrival of new information to the market.  
The results are reported in Table 5, with values in thousands of dollars. Our 
estimates based on the news announcements vary from $20.0 billion to $24.4 billion, 
based on different methods of estimation. Our results further indicate that accounting for 
abnormal reactions to patent application publications contributes another $7.8 billion to 
the value of the product.18 Given the Apple market capitalization of $190.6 billion at the 
end of 2009, the news announcement-based value of iPhone would be between 10% and 
13% of the total market capitalization, with the patent application publications 
contributing another 4% of the market capitalization.  
                                                 
18 Two of our patent application publication event dates coincides with a news announcement date. We 
have counted those as news days and excluded them from the market value of patent application 
publications calculation. Since one of the two events is connected with a positive value effect, and the other 
event is connected with almost equal negative value effect, their inclusion has a negligible effect on the 
total value.  
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We believe that our estimate of the value of iPhone to Apple is likely to establish 
a lower bound on the value estimate. First, we report all our figures in event day dollars, 
which ignores the time value of money between each event and December 31, 2009, and 
are thus biased downwards.19 Second, the development of iPhone took several years, and 
some news about the product may have leaked to the market before it was reported in 
news. Similarly, information about an invention underlying a patent application may leak 
before the application is published. Third, by excluding patent application publication 
dates with contaminating data releases, we reduce our estimate of the value of patent 
applications by over $10 billion. It is clear that events such as quarterly earnings 
announcements are likely to have a larger impact on Apple’s stock than publication of 
patent applications. However, given that such patent publications can be assumed to have 
a positive value, that value is ignored in our estimates, as we exclude days with 
contaminating events completely from our analysis. If we assume that the effect of patent 
application publications on those days is similar to the average effect among other 22 
patent application publication events (= 1.13%), the value of patent applications increases 
by approximately $632 million. 
It is interesting to contrast our estimates to the accounting information on Apple, 
Inc. According to the company’s most recent quarterly 8k filing for the fiscal quarter 
ending on September 25, 2010, the company’s net sales related to “iPhone and related 
products and services” equal $8.822 billion, which is about 43% of their total sales for 
the same quarter. This reaffirms that our estimate of the value of iPhone to Apple at 14-
17% of the firm’s market capitalization is a conservative estimate. Obviously, any 
current sales figures would ignore future growth potential (in case it differs relative to 
company’s other product lines), and synergy effects across product lines. 
                                                 
19 Our first news event with abnormal trading volume occurs on January 7, 2005, so for that event, we 
ignore almost five years of time value of money. 
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 Finally, our estimate captures at most the private value of iPhone to Apple. It 
does not capture the full social value of the invention nor even its value to the industry. 
For example, the entry by Apple into the cellular phone market could reduce the market 
share of the established cellular phone manufacturers (so called “business-stealing 
effect”). But, Apple’s entry could also increase the total market size and create 
technological spillovers, which could mitigate the business stealing effect. Furthermore, 
as this is an industry with imprecise and overlapping intellectual property rights (“a 
patent thicket”), it is difficult to enter into such an industry without violating intellectual 
property rights of the established manufacturers. The legal costs of patent infringement 
suits and associated damage or settlement payments could be factored into the stock 
market reactions. Our findings lend support to a business stealing effect that has been 
diluted by other considerations: We find that shares of Apple’s rivals typically encounter 
a negative but weak reaction both to iPhone news announcements to publications of  
patent applications related to iPhone.20  
 
5. Conclusions 
 Innovation requires funding and other resources but without reasonable 
justification for undertaking innovation, no one is willing to provide the required 
resources. In order to provide new insights to valuation of innovation, we take advantage 
of a unique case – the launch of Apple’s iPhone - in which a major firm expanded its 
product portfolio to enter into a market that is characterized by significant implicit 
barriers to entry. We study the stock market reactions to news announcements related to 
iPhone from the first hints of the product until December 31, 2009. Moreover, we also 
                                                 
20 Naturally, the estimations of full social value of iPhone should also incorporate consumer surplus besides 
industry effects.  
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study the stock market reactions to the publications of patent documents related to 
iPhone.  
We find the lower bound for the market valuation of iPhone to be high, at roughly 
30 billion U.S. dollars, with patentable technology explaining about 25% of the total 
value. We also find that Apple’s rivals experience a predominantly negative stock 
reaction both to the news about iPhone and to the publication of patent documents 
concerning iPhone. Our evidence suggests that the value of iPhone primarily stems from 
Apple’s management and marketing abilities and efforts, and to a lesser extent from 
underlying “hard” technologies and intellectual property.  
In this paper, we also complement the existing patent valuation literature, which 
aims at uncovering the effects of a firm’s patent portfolio on its Tobin’s Q, by studying 
the stock market reactions to issued patents and the publication of patent applications 
using daily stock market data. As one of the key finding of the previous patent valuation 
literature is that some patent characteristics, notably citations, are correlated with market 
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Appendix 1. News Announcements  
Date  Event 
15 December 1999 Apple registers iPhone.org 
11 September 2002 Cell phones mentioned in Jobs’ interview at 
Apple Expo 
26 July 2004 Motorola and Apple announce iTunes& 
Motorola cell phones partnership 















































27 October 2006  Apple + new patent = iPhone speculation 
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Dec 15, 1999 - Jan 9, 2007 31 13
Jan 10, 2007 - Dec 31, 2009 43 8
74 21
Table 1: News announcement events
The table reports the number of events related to iPhone introduction, identified from 
Lexis-Nexis. The first column reports all news, and the second column those that 
generate abnormal trading volume, measured as in Tkac (1999).
Average abnormal mean return (t=0) AAPL NOK MOT ERIC RIMM
all events (n=74) 0.47%* 0.29% -0.07% -0.37% -0.19%
abnormal volume events (n=22) 1.93%*** 0.20% -0.20% -0.22% -0.39%
Table 2: Abnormal returns related to news events for Apple and its competitors
The table reports the average one-day abnormal returns to Apple and those of its rivals that are available in the CRSP 
database. The asterisks indicate statistical significance at one percent (***), and ten percent (*) levels, respectively.
day-2 day-1 day0 day+1 day+2
Market model, 2003-2004 estimation period -0.26% -0.53% 1.93%*** 0.77% -0.74%
Market model, (-250,-10) estimation period -0.23%* -0.55% 1.92%*** 0.79% -0.75%**
Fama-French, 2003-2004 estimation period -0.11% -0.57% 1.92%*** 0.74% -0.80%*
Mean return model, (-250,-10) est. period -0.14% -0.48% 1.81%*** 0.44% -0.73%**
Mean return model, 2003-2004 est. period -0.11% -0.38% 1.86%*** 0.48% -0.86%
Table 3: One-day average abnormal returns around news events for Apple 
The table reports the average daily abnormal returns for Apple. The model and the estimation window used in estimating expected 
returns is indicated on each respective row. The asterisks indicate statistical significance at one percent (***), five percent (**), and 
ten percent (*) levels, respectively.
Panel A: All patent application publication days (n=97)
aapl nok mot eric rimm
day-1 0.01% 0.27% -0.20% 0.31% -0.03%
day0 0.02% 0.20% -0.31% -0.37% -0.49%
day+1 -0.36% 0.05% -0.27% -0.16% -0.03%
Panel B: Patent application publications with signif. trading volume and no contamination (n=22)
aapl nok mot eric rimm
day-1 0.29% 0.08% -0.17% 0.68% -0.78%
day0 1.13%* 0.11% 0.37% -0.50% -0.93%
day+1 -0.03% 0.13% -0.53% -0.09% -0.42%
Table 4: Daily abnormal returns around patent events 
The table reports the average daily abnormal returns for Apple and its rivals. The estimates are based on the market model with 
years 2003 and 2004 serving as the estimation window. The asterisk indicates statistical significance at the ten percent (*) level.
Model used Events used Total value
Market model news with significant volume 24,373,869$       
Market model with Fama-French factors news with significant volume 23,940,622$       
Mean return model news with significant volume 19,986,256$       
Mean return with fixed est. period news with significant volume 20,590,347$       
Market model patent apps with sign. vol. 7,801,417$         
Table 5: Market value of iPhone 
The table reports estimates of the market value of iPhone. In estimation, we use the abnormal return upon each 
event, and multiply it by the market capitalization on the day prior to the event. Models used are indicated on each 
respective row.
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